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Rhetoric of violence. 
On eristic methods used by Stalinist courts 
in the perspective of Chaïm Perelman’s theory
Marcin Pieniążek
Abstract: Eristic methods of the Stalinist courts are a phenomenon, on 
the one hand, well-documented, yet on the other hand, insufficient-
ly explored from the theoretical perspective. They can be under-
stood as forms of violence occurring in the language of the judicial 
discourse participants (judges, prosecutors), aimed at the total 
elimination of political opponents. The article is an attempt 
to characterise these methods using the conceptual instruments, 
developed by Chaïm Perelman and presented in the work Logique 
juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique and L’empire rhétorique. Rhéto-
rique et argumentation. What weighs in favour of using Perelman’s 
theory are its roots in the abundant achievements of the ancient 
rhetoric. More importantly, however, one of the main objectives 
of Perelman was the development of the modern theory of legal 
argumentation, including judicial one. In this regard, the views 
of the philosopher are adopted as a counterpoint in the rhetor-
ical analyses of the abuses of the Stalinist courts discussed on 
the example of the Trial of the Sixteen and the Trial of General 
A. E. Fieldorf „Nil”.
Keywords: Chaïm Perelman, rhetoric, eristic, Stalinist courts, politi-
cal trials
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1. Introduction
The aim of this essay is to present, on the basis of Chaïm 
Perelman’s1 thought, eristic misuses of politicized judiciary. 
The foundation constitutes the records of two famous trials 
during which Polish leaders and combatants of World War II 
were condemned by Stalinist courts with imprisonment or 
life sentence. The first of them, the trial of the sixteen lead-
ers of the Polish Underground State abducted to Moscow, is 
one of the best documented postwar demonstration trials2. 
On the other hand, the second example – the trial of Gener-
al A. Fieldorf „Nil”, is a characteristic case of „court murder” 
in Stalinist Poland3. Nonetheless, the presentation below is 
only of an exemplary, illustrative character, taking into con-
sideration that in the years 1944–1956 there were a dozen 
thousand similar politicized trials4.
The importance of the problem at issue is connected with 
Perelman’s view that legal, and especially judicial argumenta-
tion is a model example of all possible kinds of argumentation5. 
1 Chaïm Perelman (1912–1984) was a philosopher of law, logician 
and an ethics of Jewish descent. He was born in Warsaw, from where 
in 1925 his family emigrated to Belgium. Perelman was academically 
associated with the Université Libre in Brussels and his most impor-
tant works were published in French.
2 Other examples of demonstration trials include the trial of the 
President of the Board of Directors of the Association of Freedom 
and Independence – F. Niepokólczycki and his associates, and that 
of S. Mierzwa, the Deputy Secretary General of the PSL Executive 
Committee (1947); the trial of four priests of the Cracow Curia (1953); 
the trial of the bishop of Kielce Stanisław Kaczmarek (1953).
3 Other examples of “court murders” are the trials of W. Pilecki 
(1947); T. Bejt (1949); and Ł. Ciepliński (1951).
4 Military District Courts only, formed on the basis of the decree 
of the PKWN decree of 23.09.1944 rendered about 3,500 death sen-
tences (more than 1300 were executed). Most of them have been 
issued for political reasons. Cf. Rafał Leśkiewicz, Dokumentac-
ja wojskowego wymiaru sprawiedliwości jako źródło do badań nad 
historią aparatu represji [Documentation of the military judici-




5 Perelman’s abovementioned perception is mutatis mutan-
dis related to the beginnings of rhetoric influenced by the rules 
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Thinking in this vein, the indicated eristic misuses of judges, 
prosecutors and defenders can be assumed as mirroring all 
possible methods of communist propaganda6.
The essay has the following structure: Perelman’s theory 
of argumentation and the notion of eristic will be presented 
at first. Next, the two abovementioned political trials will 
be briefly described, constituting the basis for the presenta-
tion of eristic misuses. In the subsequent part of the essay 
the indicated misuses will be characterized in more details, 
on the basis of Perelman’s views as presented in his books 
Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique7 and L’empire rhéto-
rique. Rhétorique et argumentation8.
2. Chaïm Perelman’s rhetoric. Eristic.
2.1. Ancient rhetoric and Perelman’s theory of argumentation
Rhetoric9 is defined from ancient times as a skill and good art, 
namely effective persuasion (Greek: techne rhetorike; Latin: 
of constructing court speeches, written in the fifth century B.C. in Sic-
ily and applied during property ownership trials. After: Mirosław 
Korolko, Sztuka retoryki. Przewodnik encyklopedyczny [The art of rhet-
oric. Encyclopedic guide], Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1990, p. 33.
6 For example, on 16 June 1945 in the “Life of Warsaw” there was 
published an announcement of the Polpress agency which repeated the 
argumentation used in the indictment in the “Trial of the Sixteen”: “The 
public in Poland indignantly learned of the exploits of Okulicki and his 
accomplices who were accused of that they organized a diversionary 
action against the Red Army”. Access in: the Jagiellonian Library, read-
ing room of IV and V format magazines, 25.1.2016. Cf. Jerzy Bralczyk, 
“O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej” [“About the language of Pol-
ish political propaganda”], in: Halina Kurkowska (ed.), Współczesna 
polszczyzna. Wybór zagadnień [Contemporary Polish language. Select-
ed issues], Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 1981, pp. 336–354.
7 Chaïm Perelman, Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique, Pub-
lished: Dalloz, Paris 1976. Footnotes based on the Polish edition: 
Chaïm Perelman, Logika prawnicza. Nowa retoryka [Legal logic. New 
rhetoric], Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 1984.
8 Chaïm Perelman, L’empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumen-
tation, Librairie Philosophique J.VRIN, Paris 1977. Footnotes and 
quotations based on the Polish edition: Chaïm Perelman, Imperium 
retoryki. Retoryka i argumentacja [Empire of rhetoric. Rhetoric and 
argumentation], Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 2002.
9 The term “rhetoric” comes from the Greek noun rhétor, etymo-
logically derived from the form of the verb reo not preserved in the 
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ars oratoria)10. The hellenist T. Zieliński emphasized that as 
early as in its beginnings, rhetoric developed as the art of judi-
cial speech11. The theory proposed by Chaïm Perelman and 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in Traité de l’argumentation. La nou-
velle rhétorique12 (1958) was an attempt to renew antique tra-
dition the basis of which were established, among others, by 
Aristotle13 and Cicero14. At the same time, however, Perelman 
intended to create a modern and coherent theory of argumen-
tation15. His initial disappointment with logical positivism, 
both in the field of ethics and jurisprudence, motivated him 
to look for another, more universal argumentative philos-
ophy16. Perelman concluded that it was to be the rhetoric 
which refers to legal17, and especially to judicial reasoning18. 
classical Greek – “I speak purposefully, appropriately, beautifully”. 
After: M. Korolko, Sztuka retoryki…, op. cit., p. 27.
10 Mirosław Korolko, Retoryka i erystyka dla prawników [Rhetoric 
and eristic for lawyers], Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 
2000, p. 7.
11 T. Zieliński pointed out that the term rhéton meant in ancient 
Greece a strictly and clearly formulated legal norm. Over time, however, 
the centre of gravity shifted from the literal meaning of the norm to inter-
pretative and argumentative meaning, aiming to grasp the legislator’s 
thought expressed by imperfect words. Cf. Tadeusz Zieliński, „O czyta-
niu mów sądowych Cycerona w Szkole” [“About reading Cicero’s court-
room speeches in School”], Kwartalnik Klasyczny, No. 2 (1928), p. 13.
12 Chaïm Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’argumentation. 
La nouvelle rhétorique, Éd. de l’Université de Bruxelles 2008.
13 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Dover Publications, New York 2012. 
Footnotes based on the Polish edition: Aristotle, Retoryka. Retoryka 
dla Aleksandra. Poetyka [Rhetoric. Rhetoric for Alexander. Poetics], 
Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 2014.
14 Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, De oratore, or his three dialogues upon 
the character and qualifications of an orator, Ed. R.P.&C. Williams, 
Boston 1822.
15 Its basis should be “dialectical and rhetorical reasoning”. After: 
Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 144.
16 Ibidem, pp. 140–142.
17 Perelman writes, among others, about “the superiority of the 
juridical thought over philosophical one” which results from the fact 
that “the latter may rest on general and abstract formulas, and the 
former must overcome the difficulties arising from their application 
to specific problems”. After: ibidem, p. 163.
18 In addition to the judicial argumentation, Perelman characteriz-
es, among others, typical arguments of the legislator and the lawyer. 
Ibidem, pp. 180ff.
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Moreover, he claimed that judicial reasoning is of paradig-
matic character and constitutes a model example of every 
practical argumentation19. For these reasons Perelman is 
considered one of the leading contemporary theorists of legal 
argumentation20.
Perelman therefore indicated the passage from particular 
legal discourse to a general argumentation theory.21 Conse-
quently, on the basis of his thought it is possible to point out 
rhetoric misuses which were present in the practice of the 
Stalinist judicature. Moreover, it is possible to link them with 
the entire propaganda argumentation used in that period22.
According to Perelman, the measure which is applied 
to a specific argumentation is its effectiveness in a dispute23. 
19 Cf. Jerzy Stelmach, Ryszard Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa XIX i XX 
wieku [The philosophy of law of the nineteenth and twentieth century], 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 1998, p. 149.
20 Among the theoreticians of legal argumentation there should 
be mentioned, in particular, R. Alexy, J. Habermas, R. Dworkin, 
M. Atienza and P. Ricoeur (in the last period of creation). Cf. Rob-
ert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Ration-
al Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2010; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communi-
cative Action, Vol. 1, Beacon Press, Boston 1985; Ronald Dworkin, 
A matter of principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1985; 
Manuel Atienza, Las razones del derecho: teorías de la argument-
ación juridical, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México 
2003; Paul Ricoeur, The Just, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London 2000.
21 Jerzy Stelmach, Współczesna filozofia interpretacji prawniczej 
[Modern philosophy of legal interpretation], Wydział Prawa i Admi-
nistracji UJ, Kraków 1995, p. 123.
22 As for the relations of the ideology of real socialism with the 
propaganda rhetoric of the Polish People’s Republic in the perspec-
tive of anthropological theory, cf. Janusz Barański, “Ideologia i his-
toria albo epos ideologiczny” [“Ideology and history or ideological 
epic”], in: Socjotechnika, między magią a analogią. Szkice o masowej 
perswazji w PRL-u i III RP [Social engineering, between magic and 
analogy. Sketches of mass persuasion in the Polish People’s Repub-
lic and the third Republic of Poland], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2001, pp. 41–62. J. Barański’s considera-
tions directly concern martial law.
23 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., pp. 177–178. Cf. 
Jolanta Jabłońska-Bonca, O prawie, prawdzie i przekonywaniu [About 
law, truth and conviction], Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Bałtyckiej 
Wyższej Szkoły Humanistycznej, Koszalin 1999, p. 135.
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Also legal discourse is measured neither by the logical truth 
nor by falsehood but rather by the force of persuasiveness24. 
According to Perelman the aim of every argumentation is 
to encourage or reinforce the support of the statements sub-
mitted to the acceptance of certain auditorium25. In order 
to reach this goal, the speaker must match his speech to his 
audience.26 In this context, Perelman states: “A priest who 
preaches to the faithful of his church has the right to count 
that they recognize, as all the faithful, sacred texts and 
accepted dogmas. But the same sermon presented at the 
meeting of philosophers, among whom there would be many 
non-believers or followers of another religion, would certain-
ly be fun”.27 However, argumentative discourse is valid only 
after being accepted by so called “universal audience”28. 
Perelman writes: If one wants to define the audience in the 
way which is useful for the development of argumentation 
theory, it must be understood as all those people whom 
the speaker wants to influence by means of his argumen-
tation.29 Consequently, the idealizing, Kantian – like the 
notion of “universal audience” becomes the key to under-
stand Perelman’s theory of discourse30. It should be noticed 
that the philosopher introduced also a concept of particular 
24 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 147.
25 Ibidem, p. 156.
26 Ibidem, pp. 147–150.
27 Ibidem, p. 159.
28 Perelman writes “(…) it is important to recognize the superiori-
ty of the arguments that would be accepted by everyone – namely, by 
the universal auditorium: so we are saying that we are directing our 
call to the reason, that we use arguments that should be accepted by 
every intelligent being” (ibidem, p. 148.) The concept of a universal 
auditorium is essentially ideal and formal in nature. It was shaped, 
among others, under the influence of the concept of the transcenden-
tal entity and the categorical imperative of I. Kant. After: J. Stel-
mach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa…, op. cit., p. 150.
29 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 27.
30 Perelman writes that in the argumentation, “the philosopher 
is addressing the reason, namely a universal audience, all persons 
considered to be reasonable and competent”. After: Ch. Perelman, 
Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 166. Cf. Jolanta Jabłońska-Bonca, 
Prawnik a sztuka negocjacji i retoryki [Lawyer and the art of negoti-
ation and rhetoric], Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, Warszawa 
2003, p. 50.
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audience31;  in the case of the latter, the argumentation is 
effective when it is accepted by at least part of it32.
One should stress that acknowledging certain arguments 
by universal audience means that a specific argumenta-
tion is objective and rational33. In other words, guarantees 
of rationality are included in the construction of univer-
sal audience itself, which should be persuaded by the force 
of more effective, i.e. better argument. The criterion of effec-
tiveness understood in this way is supplemented by Perel-
man with the postulate of openness for criticism in the course 
of the discourse and with the requirement of tolerance. One 
should add that the philosopher agrees for pluralism in the 
cognition field; consequently, two counter-arguments can be 
acknowledged by the same audience. In this context, Perel-
man advocates a “principle of inertia”, which should not be 
rejected without justification for once accepted beliefs. 34. 
That is why when discussing the nature of reasoning the phi-
losopher claims that it does not always lead to unequivocal 
conclusions; it rather justifies conclusions carried out earli-
er. As a result, also in case of courts, one cannot always talk 
about one correct and unquestionable decision35.
All these postulates allow to take a critical insight at the 
rhetoric of the Soviet judiciary. As it will be discussed below, 
Stalinist courts could not agree, as a rule, to any pluralis-
tic consequences of argumentation, treating instrumentally 
the fundaments of rhetoric, such as its discursive character 
or the requirement of persuading the audience by means 
of a better argument.
31 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 148. Cf. 
J. Jabłońska-Bonca, O prawie, prawdzie i przekonywaniu…, op. cit., 143.
32 Perelman gives, among others, an example of a parliamenta-
ry speech in which “a speaker can divide the audience into as many 
groups as there are political parties”. After: Ch. Perelman, Logika 
prawnicza…, op. cit., pp. 147–148. Cf. J. Stelmach, Współczesna filo-
zofia…, op. cit., p. 124.
33 Critically on the assumptions of the concept of rationali-
ty proposed by Perelman the in the context of formal justice: Neil 
MacCormick, Ota Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law: New 
Approaches to Legal Positivism, Springer Science & Business Media, 
Dordrecht 1986, pp. 213ff.
34 J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa…, op. cit., p. 151.
35 Cf. J. Stelmach, Współczesna filozofia…, op. cit., p. 126.
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2.2. Eristic
At this point, the fundamental difference between rheto-
ric and eristic should be signalled. From the very begin-
ning of its existence, the latter was understood to be the 
art of conducting warring disputes (Greek techne eristike is 
derived from éristike – a quarrel, a dispute),36 in which the-
re were applied disloyal methods, i.e. sophisms 37.
Aristotle writes in the Treatise on Sophistic Evidence: 
in the same way as there is a kind of dishonesty in competi-
tion, a certain dishonest fight, in the discussion such a dis-
honest way of verbal fight is eristic. Just like those who want 
to win at all costs, they grasp all means, eristics do the same 
here.38 It should be pointed out that in the pantheon of Greek 
deities Eris was a goddess of conflict and dispute39.
B. Brożek and J. Stelmach indicate that in ancient times 
eristic’s goal was to win disputes, using all possible means, both 
allowed and forbidden ones, whilst maintaining the appearance 
of having good arguments40. So, in case of eristic conclusions 
what mattered most was their form, whilst the statements 
themselves, namely their content, only seemed to be true41. For 
this reason, Aristotle argued that one should (…) fight eristics 
in general, not as those who actually rebut evidence, but as those 
who are doing so ostensibly. We deny that they actually proved 
their view (…)42. That is why Aristotle in Rhetoric deems as 
approvable only logical and dialectic argumentative methods43. 
36 M. Korolko, Retoryka i erystyka dla prawników…, op. cit., p. 212.
37 Aristotle lists sophisms among the five ways of attaining the goal 
in the sophistic and eristic argumentation. The others are elenchos, 
paradox, solecism and “bringing the enemy to talking nonsense”. See: 
Aristotle, Topiki. O dowodach sofistycznych [Topics. About sophisti-
cal evidence], Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 1978, p. 242ff.
38 Ibidem, p. 265.
39 Marek Kochan, Pojedynek na słowa. Techniki erystyczne w pub-
licznych sporach [Battle for words. Eristic techniques in public dis-
putes], Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2005, p. 15.
40 Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek, Metody prawnicze [Legal meth-
ods], Wyd. Zakamycze, Kraków 2004, pp. 168–169.
41 Aristotle combines eristic with “the apparent syllogism (enthy-
meme)”. See Aristotle, Retoryka…, op. cit., 167–168.
42 Aristotle, Topiki…, op. cit., p. 265.
43 More precisely, Aristotle distinguishes between apodeictic syl-
logism (proper for scientific argumentation) and dialectic syllogism. 
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Consequently, according to Brożek and Stelmach, one cannot 
agree with A. Schopenhauer who claims that the goal of eris-
tic is showing rightness44. It was the goal of ancient rhetoric 
and contemporarily it is the goal of Perelman’s theory of argu-
mentation45. To the contrary, eristic discourse has one goal, i.e. 
winning, and one criterion to fulfill, neutral from moral point 
of view – effectiveness46. It must be added that Schopenhauer 
distinguished between logic and dialectics, and within the lat-
ter he distinguished the eristic dialectic. In the philosopher’s 
opinion, logic was a “science of the laws of thought”, while 
the dialectic – “the art of debate”47. The “eristic dialectic” was 
supposed to be “a science of innate human desire to be right”. 
At the same time, in Schopenhauer’s view, it constituted the 
art of discussing in such a way as to preserve the appearance 
of righteousness, i.e. per fas et nefas 48.
As discussed above, in Perelman’s theory, the effective-
ness of argumentation also plays an important role. Howev-
er, the basic criterion of acceptance of the rhetoric discourse 
is its reasonability that fulfils the function of the universal 
auditorium.49 In addition, the effectiveness in Perelman’s the-
ory is limited by the above-mentioned “postulates”. Further-
more, in Perelman’s theory the requirement of persuading 
the audience entails respect for often contradictory values50. 
To the contrary, in eristic there is no similar limitation51.
Cf. Aristotle, Retoryka…, op. cit., pp. 49–54.
44 Schopenhauer argued at the same time that the righteousness 
was to be distinguished from the objective truth. “Proving righteous-
ness” instead of “proving the objective truth” was, according to the 
philosopher, the result of the fact that man is naturally evil. Cf. 
Arthur Schopenhauer, Erystyka czyli sztuka prowadzenia sporów 
[Eristic. The art of controversy], Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 
1973, p. 24.
45 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 144.
46 Cf. Kamil Zajdler, “Erystyka w praktyce prawniczej” [“Eris-
tic in legal practice”], Legal, Economic and Sociological Movement, 
Vol. LXXI, Book 4 (2009), p. 54.
47 A. Schopenhauer, Erystyka czyli sztuka…, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
48 Ibidem, pp. 22–23.
49 J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Metody prawnicze…, op. cit., pp. 168–169.
50 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., pp. 40–43.
51 Cf. Gloria Beck, Podręcznik manipulacji. Zakazana retoryka 
[Handbook of manipulation. Forbidden rhetoric], Wydawnictwo Sen-
sus, Gliwice 2007, p. 10.
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K. Zajdler points out that also in judicial legal prac-
tice eristic, unlike rhetoric, is not the art of persuasion by 
means of reliable methods, but of overcoming the opponent 
in an oral argument per fas et nefas52. The eristic paradigm 
does not therefore fit into the model of legal argumentation 
proposed by Perelman, whose final result is to be the compro-
mise, expressed in the operative part of the ruling, “acceptable 
in a given environment and at a given moment”53. Perelman 
is aware that “in every court case there is disagreement and 
dispute”, yet he believes that the role of the judge is to find 
a solution that is “reasonable and acceptable, namely nei-
ther subjective nor arbitrary”54. For the reasoning undertaken 
in this essay there is crucial a practical temptation of a trans-
fer from rhetoric (in both classic and Perelman’s understand-
ing) to eristic, according to which victory in a dispute justifies 
application of all possible argumentative techniques55.
He points out that the “eristic turn” in the case of both 
the Soviet and the Nazi laws allowed the assumption of legal 
positivism56. For example, the thesis on the content of the 
law made by the will of the sovereign allowed the authori-
ties to subordinate the courts to ideologized laws. This has 
led to a disturbance in the relationship between the effec-
tive application of the law by the “mouth of the law” and the 
rule of law. In a similar context, Gustav Radbruch writes 
that positivism believes (…) that the legitimacy of the law 
is already proved by the fact that it has enough force in it 
to guarantee effectiveness. However, in the best of circum-
stances force can be the basis of compulsion and never – 
of duty and legitimacy.57 Perelman expresses a similar view, 
pointing out that “in a democratic society one cannot sustain 
52 K. Zajdler, “Erystyka w praktyce prawniczej…, op. cit., p. 51.
53 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 188.
54 Ibidem, p. 213.
55 On the criteria for acceptability of legal argumentative discourse: 
Jerzy Stelmach, Kodeks argumentacyjny dla prawników [Code of argu-
mentation for lawyers], Wyd. Zakamycze, Kraków 2003, p. 14ff.
56 Cf. Stelmach, Współczesna filozofia…, op. cit., pp. 34–35.
57 See Gustav Radbruch, „Ustawowe bezprawie i ponadustawowe 
prawo” [“Statutory lawlessness and extra-statutory law”], in: Gustav 
Radbruch, Filozofia prawa [Philosophy of law], Wydawnictwo PWN, 
Warszawa 2009, p. 249.
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a positivistic vision of law, according to which it would be 
merely an arbitrary expression of the will of the sovereign. 
The effective functioning of the law requires that it be accept-
ed, not imposed only by coercion”58.
3. The Stalinist trials
Below there will be presented two model examples of poli-
tical trials in order to enlighten a context in which eristic 
replaced rational argumentation in the court discourse 
of “Stalinist night”59.
3.1. The trial of “the Sixteen”
The so-called trial of “the Sixteen” was preceded by the 
arrests, undertaken by NKVD in Pruszków and deporta-
tion to Moscow of the leaders of the Polish Underground 
State60. Amongst them there was L. Okulicki, the late com-
mander of the Home Army, the chief of the Armed Forces 
in the country and J. S. Jankowski, the vice-Prime Mini-
ster, the Delegate for the Government in the country61. 
58 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 230.
59 As for the Stalinist period in Poland, see Wojciech Roszkowski, 
Historia Polski 1914–1991 [History of Poland 1914-1991], Wydawnict-
wo PWN, Warszawa 1992, pp. 151–217; Witold Pronobis, Pols-
ka i świat w XX wieku [Poland and the world in the 20th century], 
Wydawnictwo Editions Spotkania, Warszawa 1991, pp. 381–420; Nor-
man Davies, Powstanie ’44 [The Uprising of ‘44], Wydawnictwo Znak, 
Kraków 2004, pp. 663–759.
60 Jan Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu [The trial of the “Six-
teen”], Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1993, p. 57. 
Cf. Eugeniusz Duraczyński, Generał Iwanow zaprasza: przywódcy 
podziemnego państwa polskiego przed sądem moskiewskim [Gener-
al Ivanov invites: leaders of the underground Polish state before the 
Moscow court], Wydawnictwa Alfa, Warszawa 1989. Cf. W. Roszkows-
ki, Historia Polski…, op. cit., p. 153; W. Pronobis, Polska i świat…, 
op. cit., pp. 333–334.
61 The remaining persons accused were to K. Pużak, A. Bień, 
A. Pajdak, S. Jasiukowicz, K. Bagiński, A. Zwierzyński, J. Chaciński, 
E. Czarnowski, S. Mierzwa, F. Urbański, Z. Stypułkowski, 
S. Michałowski, K. Kobylański and J. Stemler. Cf. Eugeniusz 
Duraczyński, “Wprowadzenie” [“Introduction”], in: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów, kierowników i uczestników 
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The right to be deported and prosecuted was derived by the 
Soviet side from the agreements signed on 26 July 1944 
by E. Osóbka – Morawski and V. Molotov on the relations 
between the Soviet command and the PKWN administra-
tion and on the Polish – Soviet state border62. After being 
deported, general Okulicki and others spent almost three 
months in prison in Łubianka where they were intensely 
interrogated and “prepared” to a trial for effect63. During 
that period they were forced to reveal, inter alia, the fact 
of existence of confidential anti-communistic organization 
“NIE” (“No”) established by general A. E. Fieldorf “Nil” 
This information was confirmed in the course of the trial64.
The “show trial” was arranged from June the 18th to June 
the 21st 1945 before the Military College of the Supreme Sovi-
et of the USSR. The trial itself was carried out in the follow-
ing way: after deporting the Poles from Łubianka, they were 
seated on a stage, in two rows of chairs. There were guards 
standing face to face with the prisoners, carrying rifles with 
bayonets65. The trial took place in the same courtroom that 
the one of the thousands of Bolsheviks sentenced with death 
penalty in the great Stalin purge in the years 1936-193866. 
polskiego podziemia w zapleczu Armii Czerwonej na terytorium Pol-
ski, Litwy oraz obwodów zachodnich Białorusi i Ukrainy Kolegium 
Wojskowe Sądu Najwyższego ZSRR, 18–21 czerwca 1945 r. w Mosk-
wie [Court report on the organizers, managers and participants of the 
Polish underground in the Red Army hubs on the territory of Poland, 
Lithuania and the western districts of Belarus and Ukraine. Military 
College of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, 18-21 June 1945 
in Moscow], Wydawnictwo KAW, Rzeszów 1991, pp. II–V. The publi-
cation is a reprint of the original report published by the Legal Pub-
lishing House of the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 
Moscow 1945.
62 According to point 7 of the first of the aforementioned agreements 
the crimes committed by the Polish people against the Soviet troops in the 
zone of war operations were subject to the “jurisdiction of the Soviet chief 
commander”. See E. Duraczyński, “Wprowadzenie…, op. cit., p. VI.
63 J. Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu…, op. cit., pp. 64–65.
64 Cf. the fragments from court report, in: Maria Fieldorf, Leszek 
Zachuta, Generał „Nil” August Emil Fieldorf [General “Nil” August Emil 
Fieldorf], Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, Warszawa 1993, pp. 148–169.
65 Visible on documentary photos of the trial.
66 Among others, the marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tuchac-
zewski. Cf. J. Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu…, op. cit., p. 67.
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The indictment included the following charges, divided into 
five chapters67:
1. organizing underground armed units of the Home 
Army at the rear of the Red Army;
2. forming underground military-political organization 
“Niepodległość” (“NIE”);
3. terrorist-sabotage and spy activity of underground 
military units of the Home Army and “NIE”;
4. the activity of illegal transmitting-receiving radio sta-
tions of the Home Army and the Polish ‚underground’ gov-
ernment at the rear of the Red Army;
5. the plan of preparing warfare together with Germany 
against USSR68.
The prosecution deemed “illegality” of the Home Army 
and it subjected to utter criticism still internationally rec-
ognized Polish emigration government in London69. Not 
surprisingly, the final argumentation reflected the above-
mentioned “crimes” of these organizations70. One should 
add that the Soviet court-appointed defenders met the 
accused not earlier than in the courtroom. Moreover, some 
of the accused were puzzled by their defenders pleadings 
since the latter condemned their conspiratorial activity 
and pleaded guilty71.
67 The basis of this was art. 58 of the Criminal Code of the USSR 
of 1926 on the grounds of which people were charged for counter-rev-
olutionary activities.
68 The entire indictment in: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie 
organizatorów…, op. cit., pp. 8–34.
69 Simultaneously to the trial in Moscow there took place the dis-
cussions on the establishment of the Interim Government of National 
Unity. Nevertheless, diplomatic recognition for the London Govern-
ment of the Polish Republic in exile was withdrawn by the United 
States and Great Britain only on July 5, 1945.
70 From the final accusation speech: “From the dark alleys of its 
dark underground, all these „underground ministers” and members 
of the so-called „parliament”, Okulicki, and others with him, puppets 
playing with the politics who are now sitting on the bench of crimi-
nals, reached their criminal hands trying to put the Red Army’s blow 
in the back”, in: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, 
op. cit., p. 239.
71	 In	particular,	in	the	defence	speech	of	Bień	and	Jasiukow-
icz there appeared the accusations addressed to L. Okulicki. After: 
ibidem, p. 279. Cf. footnote 134.
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The barristers also assured that their clients felt remorse 
and they asked court for showing real Soviet magnanimi-
ty72. As a consequence, three Poles, including general Oku-
licki, resigned from legal representation and defended the 
case on their own73.
At the end of the trial, the prosecutor delivered an argu-
mentation in which he outlined the Stalinist vision of the 
recent Polish history. He stated that the trial summed up 
criminal activity of the Polish reaction which for many years 
fought against the Soviet Union and it sold the interests 
of its nation74. He aimed to prove, referring also to J. Sta-
lin’s opinion, that prewar Polish leaders preferred to carry 
out a game between Germany and the Soviet Union, which 
led to sanctioning government to the September defeat, 
and then exposed the Soviet Union to the great danger75. 
The prosecutor’s discourse included the strong assessment 
of the Home Army which bombed, murdered Soviet citizens 
(…) cruelly treated and harassed in a gruesome way and 
by doing it they were hardly different from German cru-
elty76. Due to this propaganda, in the rendered judgment 
there was nothing about the death penalty77. As a result 
of “the Soviet mercy” thirteen accused were sentenced to rel-
atively lenient punishment, and the three of them have 
been acquitted78. Nonetheless, general Okulicki, sentenced 
to 10 years of imprisonment, according to the Soviet files 
died on 24 of December 1946. Similarly, J. S. Jankowski, 
sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment, died in prison on 
72 After: Ibidem, p. 281.
73 Okulicki delivered a one and a half hour defence speech. Cf. 
Ibidem, pp. 269–278.
74 Ibidem, p. 238.
75 Ibidem.
76 Ibidem, p. 256.
77 Ibidem, pp. 318–319.
78 In the trial there were imposed the following penalties of depriva-
tion of liberty: L. Okulicki – 10 years; J. S. Jankowski – 8 years; S. Jasi-
ukowicz – 5 years; A. Bień – 5 years; A. Pajdak (in a separate trial) 
– 5 years; K. Pużak – 1,5 years; K. Bagiński – 1 year; A. Zwierzyński – 
8 months; E. Czarnowski – 6 months; J. Chaciński – 4 months; S. Mier-
zwa – 4 months; Z. Stypułkowski – 4 months; F. Urbański – 4 months. 
Found not guilty: S. Michałowski, K. Kobylański and J. Stemler.
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13 of March 195379. In the Soviet camp on 22 October 1946 
there also died S. Jasiukowicz. The other defendants were 
subjected after the punishment to various repressions of the 
communist authorities in Poland80.
3.2. The Trial of General Fieldorf “Nil”
The second discussed trial is a model example of Stali-
nist judicial murder and it concerns Polish general, August 
Emil Fieldorf “Nil”81. During World War II he was the com-
mander of the Kedyw (special operations executive) of the 
Main Headquarter of the Home Army and deputy comman-
der-in-chief under general L. Okulicki82. As mentioned abo-
ve, amongst his activities he established an anticommunist 
organization “NIE”83. In the year 1945 “Nil” was acciden-
tally caught by NKVD and without being recognized was 
deported to Ural, where he worked for two years in the 
labour camps84. After coming back to Poland he revealed 
himself, was arrested on November the 9th 1950 and put 
in prison85. There he was offered a collaboration, consisting, 
inter alia, of signing appropriate appeal to the previous sol-
diers of the Home Army to follow communist’s authorities86. 
Fieldorf refused and then, before the trial, he was told by 
the officers of security service that he would be hanged87.
79 According to a letter from the MFA of the USSR to the Polish 
authorities of 3 November 1989, L. Okulicki and J. Jankowski died 
of heart disease.
80 J. Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu…, op. cit., pp. 82–86.
81 Cf. W. Roszkowski, Historia Polski…, op. cit., p. 207; W. Prono-
bis, Polska i świat…, op. cit., p. 400.
82 M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., pp. 89–112.
83 The concept and the general principles of organization forma-
tion are known from the message of General T. Bór-Komorowski 
to General K. Sosnkowski of 23 November 1943. The assumptions 
of the organization were formulated in the Statute and Instruction 
of “NIE” („NO”). After: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, 
op. cit., pp. 113–122.
84 Fieldorf was hiding then under the pseudonym Walenty Gda-
nicki. As for his stay in the camps see: ibidem, pp. 169–192.
85 Cf. N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., p. 755.
86 M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 201.
87 Ibidem, p. 262.
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A formal indictment accused “Nil” of the crimes stat-
ed in the decree about punishing Nazi murderers and col-
laborators, i.e. of participation in killing civilians, military 
men and prisoners of war88. The indictment was approved 
and announced during the trial (held in camera) on the 16th 
April 1952. Despite several months of trial general “Nil” 
announced that he did not plead guilty89.
The evidence presented by prosecution consisted in bat-
tle dispatch about fights with the Soviet guerrilla and the 
units of Polish pro-Soviet guerrilla (the People’s Army). It 
was also based upon a forced testimony of two officers of the 
Home Army who knew the general from Kedyw90. Nil’s 
defender issued a motion of appointing an expert witness 
and then about the right to appoint additional witnesses. 
Both these motions were dismissed “as a result of a suffi-
cient explanation of the said issue and the documentation 
at hand” 91. The prosecutor asked for judging the defendant 
pursuant to article 1 of the abovementioned decree, which 
provided only for capital punishment. Ultimately, only after 
few hours of the trial, the court decided: To find August 
Fieldorf “Nil” guilty of alleged charges stated in the indict-
ment on the basis of article 1 point 1 of the decree of 31st 
August 1944 about punishing Nazi murderers and to sen-
tence him to death penalty. In the merits of reason of the 
judgment the court stated that it did not find any circum-
stances that could alleviate the defendant’s guilt. (…) Fiel-
dorf was guilty not only of the blood of victims of fratricide 
murders and even the blood of victims murdered by the Ger-
man fascists – because by his activity, the accused hindered 
the country’s liberation92.
The opinion of the composition of the court, issued after 
the judgement to the Supreme Court, stated as follows: 
88 Ibidem, p. 236.
89 The protocol of the main hearing of 16 April 1952 of the Provin-
cial Court for Warsaw, case files: IV, K.311/51, vol. III.
90 These were T. Grzmielewski “Igor” and W. Liniarski “Mścisław”.
91 M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., pp. 245–246.
92 M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 248. Cf. Tade-
usz M. Pużański, “Mordercy generała Nila” [“The murderers of gen-
eral Nil”], Tygodnik Solidarność, No. 13/1999.
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(…) Fieldorf does not deserve mercy. The accused showed 
great will of crime. (…) According to court there is no possi-
bility of the resocialization of the accused93. On the 20th Octo-
ber 1952 the Polish Supreme Court kept the verdict of the 
capital punishment in force. Also, president B. Bierut 
did not take advantage of the right of grace request-
ed by Fieldorf’s wife, daughter94 and 87-year old father95. 
The sentence was carried out by hanging on 24th Febru- 
ary 195396.
4. Communist eristic compared with rhetoric in the light of Ch. Perelman’s theory
4.1. Eristic in the action of the Stalinist courts – general remarks
One should indicate that in the two presented cases the 
argumentation used by prosecutors and judges aimed, by 
any costs, to effective elimination of political opponents. 
Considering the latter fact, in the context of the described 
trials there will be subject to analysis eristic misuses per-
petrated by the Stalinist courts97.
From the birth of the ancient rhetoric, in the court ora-
tory art there is applied the so-called “judging type” (Greek: 
dikainikón génos; Latin: genus iudicale). It includes persua-
sive statements regarding the past time that are used to pros-
ecute or defend98. However, in keeping with the requirements 
of rhetoric art, the use of the judging type by the partici-
pants in court proceedings is not per se identical with eris-
tic99. As mentioned above – eristic, from its definition, aims at 
93 Case files, vol. III, K. 70. After: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał 
„Nil”…, op. cit., p. 259.
94 N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., p. 756.
95 M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 258.
96 Ibidem, p. 262.
97 The illustrative citations from court reports, protocols and judg-
ments were for the sake of clarity included in the footnotes.
98 M. Korolko, Sztuka retoryki…, op. cit., p. 48.
99 Cf. Lech Morawski, Argumentacje, racjonalność prawa 
i postępowanie dowodowe [Argumentations, rationality of law and evi-
dence proceedings], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu im. Mikołaja Koperni-
ka, Toruń 1988.
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winning the dispute under the pretext of having good argu-
ments and with the use of all means, both allowed as well 
as prohibited ones100. One can point out four of the most 
typical eristic methods, namely: 1) using the so-called “eris-
tic expansion”, namely behaving and acting in such way as 
to cause chaos in argumentation and lead to disorientation 
of the opponent; 2) referring to actual or alleged approval 
of the public by proving that the opponent’s views are incon-
sistent with the views of this audience, irrespective of the 
fact whether such inconsistence in fact exists; 3) “fabricat-
ing the consequences” which consists in inferring, by means 
of groundless (false) conclusions, such statements from the 
opponent’s speech which were not in fact included in it; 
4) hiding the goal that the argumentation really aims at.101
These methods were applied, in a representative way, 
during the abovementioned trials. The fact of deporting the 
sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground State to Moscow 
is the best example of “physical” use of the first method102. 
What can be also included therein are the tortures used 
during the investigations, for example, those taking place 
in respect of witnesses before general Fieldorf’s trial103. As 
a consequence, defendants’ testimonies in courtrooms were 
often ambiguous and uncertain104. A typical method used 
100 The practical “guide” to the modern application of eristic meth-
ods is G. Beck’s book titled: Podręcznik manipulacji. Zakazana 
retoryka…, op. cit. The book contains, however, a “scale of ethical 
uncertainties” concerning the various methods, cf. pp. 327–328.
101 J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Metody prawnicze…, op. cit., pp. 168–169.
102 P. Ricoeur calls the deceit “a distorted form of irony and dex-
terity” and considers it a manifestation of evil at the interpersonal 
level. Paul Ricoeur, O sobie samym jako innym [Oneself as another], 
Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 2005, p. 366.
103 Cf. footnote 75. W. Liniarski was brought to the hearing room 
on the stretcher. He was so devastated that Fieldorf did not recognize 
him at first. After: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., 
p. 240.
104 For example, T. Grzmielewski „Igor” testified on 28 February 
1957, during the trial of W. Liniarski, that the testimony against 
Fieldorf was enforced on him. Grzmielewski said: “For 4 days I was 
constantly interrogated, beaten, that at the end of the hearing I did 
not know what was going on with me”. Quote from the case file (case 
file number: IV. K. 13/57, pages 33-34), after: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachu-
ta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 268.
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by the communist courts was also referring to supposed-
ly common social approval of the Red Army liberators and 
new communist authorities by “the nation” or “the people”105. 
It was one of the most common arguments of the propagan-
da, justifying the committed political crimes, which, as one 
can see, followed the scheme of the second of eristic methods. 
The third method was also used in the courtrooms. State-
ments about being a member of the Home Army and the 
authorities of the Polish Underground State, presented by 
the defendants, constituted the basis to draw the conclusion 
about anti-Soviet activity or about the murders on civilians 
and soldiers of the Red Army106. This argument was brought 
to the limits of eristic by connecting the membership in the 
Home Army with collaborating with the Nazis; the justifica-
tion of the judgement of capital punishment issued in gen-
eral Fieldorf “Nil” trial can serve as a model example107. 
Not surprisingly, Stalinists courts to a smaller (like in case 
of Fieldorf) or to a bigger extent (like in case of the trial 
of the Sixteen) applied also the fourth eristic method, hid-
ing the real motive of their activity. One should note that 
the specificity of propaganda carried out in the Stalinist 
period directed towards the western states, was manifested 
in acting under the pretext of democratic and fair society108. 
In the field of judiciary it was manifested in maintaining 
105 The prosecutor in speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: 
“The Polish nation, grateful to the Soviet people, grateful to the Red 
Army – its liberator, took its breath away again”. After: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 244.
106 Public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: “We bow 
our heads in front of the bright memory of hundreds of Red Army offic-
ers and soldiers, hundreds of Soviet citizens killed and tormented by 
criminals from the «the Home Army». We will be forever honouring the 
memory of major 134 (…) motorized battalion, the Hero of the Soviet 
Union, Kanarczuk, killed and then burnt by bandits from the «Home 
Army» on 24 August 1944 near the village of Grodno”. After: ibidem, 
p. 239.
107 Cf. footnote 77.
108 The example is a picture of happy Soviet Russia created by the 
Bolshevik authorities during a trip organized for Bertrand Russell and 
other British left-wing representatives in 1920. See Bertrand Russel, 
The practice and theory of bolshevism, Cosimo. Inc., New York 2007. 
Cf. Paul Johnson, Intelektualiści [Intellectuals], Editions Spotkania, 
Warsaw 1988, p. 227.
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an illusion of fair trial. The opinion expressed by British 
ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr in Moscow after the tri-
al of the Sixteen that “nobody was sentenced with capital 
punishment, the defendants could defend themselves”, can 
serve as the evidence of how effective that method was109.
Perelman’s theory allows for a deeper characterization 
of signalled, eristic abuse of Stalinist courts. On its basis 
it will be analyzed how communist prosecutors and judg-
es violated the principles of ars bene dicendi110. The further 
argument will be divided into three points, devoted to: 1. the 
role of the auditorium, the truth and the hierarchy of val-
ues in the argumentation; 2. the role of authority and dis-
course in the courtroom; 3. other argumentative methods 
of the Soviet courts. These issues are not disjoint; in refer-
ence to the Empire of rhetoric, however, they allow to sort 
out the varied aspects of the eristic abuse of the “Stalinist” 
judicial system.
4.2. Auditorium, the truth and the hierarchy of values
According to Perelman’s abovementioned opinion, the aim 
of every argumentation is to win or foster already won 
audience (…).To reach this goal the speaker must adjust 
his speech to the audience111. Totalitarian power used quite 
the opposite scheme, preliminarily creating a dependent 
audience – the defendants, the press, etc.112. Perelman stres-
ses that: Adjusting to the audience primarily consists in cho-
osing such premises as argumentation of these thesis which 
were acknowledged by the audience.113 At the same time, 
the philosopher points out that argumentation is correct 
only when it involves undermining the obvious114. From 
this point of view, in the communist courts, the argumen-
109 Cf. N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., pp. 615–616.
110 Cf. M. Korolko, Sztuka retoryki…, op. cit., p. 42.
111 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 22, 34.
112 The courtroom during the trial of the leadership of the Under-
ground State was filled by a carefully selected audience, including 
the representatives of the Western press. Cf. J. Kochanowski, Proces 
Szesnastu…, op. cit., p. 67.
113 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 36.
114 Ibidem, p. 19.
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tative process was based on purely parsimonious rhetoric, 
which underlies the adjustment of the audience to the utte-
red thesis of accusation. Consequently, courts were able 
to act under the pretext of common approval of prosecutors’ 
propositions and forced their acknowledgement without the 
necessity of searching for compromise, of changing argu-
mentation, etc. The degree of the adaptation of the audi-
torium gathered in the courtroom during the trial of the 
Sixteen reflects its reaction of ridiculing the accused’s sta-
tements115.
The audience was additionally manipulated during the 
trial, particularly by means of misuses in the sphere of such 
notions as the truth, fact, supposition and value. Perel-
man writes: Within the range of the approved propositions 
among which the speaker chooses the point of departure for 
his speech, the ones that should be sectioned off, are those 
which concern reality, namely facts, truths, suppositions; and 
these which concern most desired things, namely value[s](…). 
If we award “fact” or “the truth” with the status of objective 
element (…) we will be able to assume facts and the truth as 
unchangeable data, so that a bigger support of the audience 
for them will not be necessary any more. (…) However, at 
the moment when a fact or the truth are questioned by the 
audience, the speaker cannot use them, unless the opponent 
is wrong or, at least, he notes that there is no reason to take 
into account his opinion, that is disqualifying the opponent 
by means of depriving him of the features of a competent and 
wise interlocutor116. In a similar context, Perelman points 
out in Legal Logic that a wrong qualification of facts can be 
used in practice to persecute political opponents117. One may 
say in a comment that the Stalinist courts, subordinating 
the audience, simultaneously imposed arbitrary interpre-
tation of “facts” concerning the activities of the Home Army 
115 For example: [Prosecutor]: “The defendant is the chief command-
er. There was systematic diversionary work carried out in the eastern 
districts, terrorist acts were undertaken in the rear of the Red Army. 
Who is responsible for these acts? Okulicki: I am not guilty of this, but 
I am responsible (laughing in the courtroom)”. After: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 156.
116 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
117 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 193.
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and accorded them with the status of “objective truth”118. 
At the same time, the leaders of the Underground State 
representing different views on the “facts”, were deprived 
of the actual position of the “interlocutor”, i.e. the party 
in the litigation.
Furthermore, according to Perelman, apart from facts 
and truth we also count on suppositions which do not have 
the same degree of certainty (…) but they constitute a suffi-
cient basis to support a fair belief. Suppositions are usual-
ly associated with events which are likely to occur and on 
which it is wise to support the argumentation.119
Similarly, a number of false charges against the defend-
ants in the trial of the Sixteen and against general Fieldorf 
were formulated by means of suppositions, including those 
about murdering the civilians and political opponents120. One 
may note that defamatory arguments towards the accused 
were often formulated in aprioric way121.
According to Perelman, the argumentation on its basis 
must appeal to a specific hierarchy of values. The philos-
opher explains that (…) the word “value” can be always 
applied in case of doing away with uniformity or equity 
between things, in any place where one of the things must 
be situated before or above another, in every place where it is 
118 The public prosecutor in the speech at the end of the trial of the 
Sixteen: “The terrorist-subversive character of the underground troops 
of the Home Army and «NIE» has been undoubtedly established. They 
were created for this purpose. Terror, diversion and spying were the 
basis of the program, if it is at all possible to use the term «program» 
against the bandits”. After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organ-
izatorów…, op. cit., p. 156.
119 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 38.
120 From Fieldorf’s indictment: “Pursuant to the politics of «the 
London government» and the Home Army, in the mid 1943 Fieldorf 
August issued an order to the district commanders of the Home Army 
«Kedyw» to fight and liquidate left-wing conspirators, in particular 
the PPR and AL, and their respective activists, partisans and Soviet 
jumpers”. Reprint of indictment in: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał 
„Nil”…, op. cit., p. 328.
121 For example: [Prosecutor]: “So already in December the defend-
ant sanctioned diversionary-terrorist operations in (…) eastern dis-
tricts? Okulicki: I ordered to carry out organizational work throughout 
Poland in order to create «NIE»”. After: Sprawozdanie sądowe 
w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 152.
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assumed as superior and that which deserves to be desired122. 
In this way the notion of value and hierarchy of values may 
be used in argumentation to formulate conclusions of an 
assessing character, which aims at discrediting the oppo-
nent’s argument. Such definition of a value concerns particu-
larly hierarchies in which the ordered elements are clearly 
recommended. Negative or positive values very often indicate 
favourable or unfavourable attitude in relation to the things 
(…) without comparing them to other things123.
Perelman therefore considers as the centre of argumen-
tation to be in favour of or against certain values, or a cer-
tain hierarchy. At the same time, the philosopher writes 
that “[rhetoric – M.P.] reasoning is intended to reach an 
agreement on values and their applications in a situation 
of dispute”124. Likewise, Perelman believes that the key task 
of a judge is to resolve the conflict between the values pre-
ferred by the parties consisting in expressing the “accepta-
ble compromise” in the judgment125.
In the rhetoric of the Stalinist courts positive values 
were expressed in a favourable attitude towards the author-
ity of Generalissimus126, the operations of the Red Army127, 
Marxist philosophy, etc. After assuming such “universal” 
axiology, Stalinist courts a priori regarded the activi-
ty of Polish underground army as incoherent and crimi-
nal. It was the reason why the prosecutor in his discourse, 
delivered in the trial of the Sixteen, accused the Polish 
emigration government in London of dishonest politics128. 
122 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 39.
123 Ibidem.
124 Ibidem, p. 144.
125 Ibidem, p. 180.
126 Stalin was given this title on 27 June 1945.
127 Public prosecutor in his speech at the end of the trial of the Six-
teen: “the Red Army, in heavy battles, defeated the Nazi war machine 
and rescued the peoples of Europe from being held down by the Nazi 
imperialism and saved them from extinction”. After: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 238.
128 Public prosecutor in his speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: 
“The reactionary Polish „government” in London, in the hands of pro-
Nazi elements, has sometimes given the impression that it cannot exer-
cise the will of the nation, but, on the contrary, it pursues its policy so that 
it always goes along with the Nazi Germany”. After: ibidem, p. 242.
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Imposed axiological assumptions made by court, in Fiel-
dorf’s trial, came to the conclusion about “demoralization 
and impossibility of resocialization”129. Simultaneously, two 
presented cases dealt with depreciation of values connected 
with the activity of Polish resistance movement and Polish 
Underground State, assuming its continuity with pre-war 
government130. On this account from the very beginning 
of World War II the Soviet Union representatives, such as 
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, W. Molotov, talked 
about “bankruptcy of Polish country131” – referred as “an 
ugly product of Versailles [treaty]132”. The basis of this rhet-
oric was a presupposed superiority of communist values over 
“bourgeois” ones and, in consequence, unquestionable argu-
mentation of Stalinist courts over the leaders of the Polish 
Underground State.
One remembers that during the discussed trials the courts 
countered all manifestations of polemics with the presup-
posed hierarchy of values assumed by the prosecution. Con-
sequently, “the defence” in the trial of the Sixteen accepted 
all charges formulated in the indictment133. Perelman seems 
to be particularly significant in this context, saying that: 
The description which seems to be neutral reveals its par-
tiality, when we can contrast it with a different one (…) 
129 Cf. N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., p. 756.
130 From the justification of General Fieldorf’s judgment: “During 
the occupation in Poland, the sanctioning clash, despite the Septem-
ber defeat, did not give up the desire for power. Both in the so-called 
government in exile and in the right-wing military organizations that 
were formed (…) in the country, the main positions are taken by (…) 
the sanctioners and fascists”. Reprint of files in: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachu-
ta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 333.
131 The German-Polish war revealed the internal bankruptcy of the 
Polish state. Wording from the note sent by W. Molotov to the embassy 
of the Republic of Poland in Moscow, justifying the entry of the Red Army 
to Poland on 17 September 1939. Cf. Jacek Ślusarczyk, Polska a Pań-
stwo Radzieckie. Kalendarium 1918–1939 [Poland and the Soviet State. 
Calendar 1918 – 1939], Wydawnictwo AWM, Warsaw 1996, p. 156.
132 Cf. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force: Political and 
moral dimensions. Volume one, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, 1988, p. 49.
133 More broadly about the specifics of the lawyer’s argumenta-
tion in court litigation: Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., 
pp. 208–212.
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It was Aristotle who pointed out at this phenomenon: Orestes 
can be called a “matricide”, in a different context he can be 
referred to as “father’s avenger”. Each of these expressions (…) 
shows only one aspect of the reality. Perelman writes in the 
next sentence as follows: Such descriptions assume certain 
arrangement in hierarchy performed earlier. (…) Particular 
classes can be established by means of conjunctions “and” 
or “neither”. Associating one element with another one, we 
bring them together and we try to find a common denomi-
nator for them.134
Such technique of common denomination was used by 
the Soviet courts in the presented cases. Since the activities 
of the Polish Home Army and the Underground State did 
not reflect the communist hierarchy of values, they were con-
sidered to belong to the same category as the actions under-
taken by Nazi Germany135. The achievement of a “compromise 
of value” through argumentative discourse was thus excluded 
by the Stalinist jurisprudence in a priori manner136. In summa-
ry of this point it should be pointed out that the falsified audito-
rium, the arbitrary concept of truth, and the imposed hierarchy 
of values constituted, from the perspective of Perelman’s views, 
the essence of the eristic abuse in the discussed trials.
4.3. Authority and discourse
The concept of truth in the argumentative discourse is cor-
related by Perelman with the issue of the authority suppor-
ting it. According to the philosopher, the status of the truth 
or a fact is not a property given forever unless we assume the 
134 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 61.
135 Consequently, in the Soviet newspapers there appeared articles 
regarding the trial of the Sixteen. “Destroy the agents of Nazi Germa-
ny”; “Polish fascist bandits posing for democrats”; “Executioners act-
ing in the name of Hitler”. After: N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., 
p. 613.
136 From the justification of the judgment of General Fieldorf: “The 
Soviet Army was a more dangerous enemy for the capitalist minions 
than the Nazis, bringing the national and social liberation of the 
working masses from the Nazi occupant which in fact killed the people 
and devastated the Polish culture, but was an ally, it did not threaten 
the possession – in the social battle it was on the same side of the bar-
ricade”. Reprint of files in: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, 
op. cit., p. 333.
32 | Marcin Pieniążek |
existence of authority of a certain divine creature whose sta-
tements and revelations would be irrefutable137. It should be 
pointed out that the argument “from authority” is someti-
mes regarded as decisive also in legal discourse (Argumen-
tum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege138). Perelman adds, 
however, that (…) in the face of the lack of absolute guaran-
tee, in the face of the lack of obviousness or necessity which 
would suggest itself to every wise being, facts and the truth 
acknowledged by common opinion or by specialists’ opinion 
can be questioned.139
The philosopher’s abovementioned remarks refer to the 
mechanism of “truth verification” in totalitarian systems. 
Also in the courtrooms where the discussed trials took place, 
Stalin’s divine-like authority140, based on the foundations 
of Marxism – Leninism ideology141, was a guarantee of push-
ing through every legally relevant “fact”142 and “truth”143. 
137 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 37.
138 Cf. Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and 
Illustrated, T. & J.W. Johnson, Philadelphia 1864.
139 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 37.
140 Public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: “In this 
war [Great Patriotic War – M.P.] the Soviet people defended the right-
eous and holy cause and defended it (…) under the leadership of the 
brilliant Red Army commander, the Soviet Union Marshal, Joseph 
Stalin”. After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, 
op. cit., pp. 238–239.
141 The similarities of Marxism and religion are drawn attention to, 
among others, by Nikolai Berdyaev and Raymond Aaron. Cf. Nikolai 
Berdyaev, Christian Existentialism; A Berdyaev Anthology, Harper 
Torchbooks, Harper & Row, New York 1965; Nikolai Berdyaev, Mark-
sizm i religia [Marxism and religion], Wydawnictwo Głosy, Poznań 
1984; Raymond Aron, Opium intelektualistów [Opium of the intellec-
tuals], Wydawnictwo Muza, Warsaw 2000.
142 The defender in the speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: 
“Everyone knows the enthusiasm the Polish nation welcomed the Red 
Army, everyone knows how much the Red Army has done for the Pol-
ish nation”. After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, 
op. cit., p. 280.
143 The public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: “The 
Red Army, says Comrade Stalin, is an army that defends peace and 
friendship among nations of all countries. It was created not to con-
quer other countries but to defend the borders of its country. The Red 
Army was always respectful of the rights and independence of all 
peoples”. After: ibidem, p. 239.
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In the discussed trials, the argumentation based on the 
Red Army’s authority was often used in order to depreciate 
any action taken by the Home Army and “NIE”144. Howev-
er, Perelman points out that the power of the argumenta-
tion ab auctoritate is at the same time its greatest weakness. 
The argument of authority is valid only in the situation 
of a complete lack of persuasive evidence. It will constitute 
the basis of other arguments and the person using them will 
not overlook any occasion to emphasize the authority which 
is consistent with its thesis and undermines the thesis of the 
opponent. Unquestionable authority in the last instance is 
divine authority.145
Since the courts mirrored Stalin’s unquestionable will146 
the accused could not formulate any effective argument 
in favour of their defence. It was also consistent with the prac-
tice of the Soviet courts, just like in Fieldorf “Nil” trial, of vir-
tually determining the judgments even before the beginning 
of the trial.
The question of ab auctoritate argumentation in Perel-
man’s conception is related to the question of the possibili-
ty of real discourse in which the power of a better argument 
should prevail. According to the philosopher, there is a dan-
ger that discourse – authority relation will become inverse-
ly proportional. Perelman emphasizes: Argumentation aims 
at influencing the listeners, at modifying their beliefs and 
attitudes by means of speech whose goal is to obtain their 
144 The public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: 
“The heroic battle of the Red Army during the Great War of the 
Nations will stay forever on the cards of world history, as an immor-
tal manifestation of heroism (…) Our victory today is celebrated by all 
peace loving nations, all those who sincerely desire peace throughout 
the world and freedom for all humanity (…) And against this hero-
ic army, against the liberating army, there were turned the crimi-
nal plans of the defendants. These gentlemen, bypassing the limits 
of impudence and shamelessness, allowed themselves to call the «Red 
Army» new occupant”. After: ibidem, p. 239.
145 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 112.
146 In a similar context, H. Arendt writes that “in the Nazi Germa-
ny, the Führer’s will was the source of law, and his order was in force 
by law”. After: Hannah Arendt, Odpowiedzialność i władza sądzenia 
[Responsibility and authority to judge], Wydawnictwo Prószyński 
i S-ka, Warsaw 2006, p. 274.
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approval rather than imposing one’s will by means of train-
ing or compulsion (…)147.
Not surprisingly, investigative methods applied during 
the discussed trials, particularly aimed at imposing pros-
ecutors’ standpoint by means of compulsion, were an ulti-
mate negation of the requirement of discursive interaction148. 
Also, another of Perelman’s opinion should be quoted in this 
place: As can be seen, the whole argumentation assumes first 
the contact between people, which can be fostered or hindered 
by social institutions. It is enough to think about a monop-
oly of the means of communication, characteristic for abso-
lute states, as well as about all possible means of enabling 
or preventing the contact between people149. As pointed out, 
“social institutions” of the Stalinist system, including courts, 
did not agree for any discursive interaction; moreover, the 
attempt of a real defence was understood as an activity aim-
ing to limit the authority of the communist power. H. Arendt 
writes that the “mark of assurance” of authority is the abso-
lute recognition of those by whom the obedience is demand-
ed; therefore, neither coercion nor persuasion is needed150. 
One may say in this context that Okulicki’s self-defence was 
treated as “blasphemy” and resulted in his retaliatory death 
in the Soviet prison151.
In the summary of this point, it should be pointed out 
that an unrestricted argumentation from authority in con-
nection with the elimination of interactions in the discourse 
was an effective eristic method used by the Stalinist courts. 
It is clear that in the rhetorically acceptable court case, the 
measures applied by the communist prosecutors and judges 
would discredit the undertaken argumentation. As Perelman 
writes (…) an attitude which would humiliate the speaker 
147 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 23.
148 Cf. Michał Głowiński, „O dyskursie totalitarnym” [„About total-
itarian discourse”], in: Dzień Ulissesa i inne szkice na tematy niemito-
logiczne [Ulisses day and other sketches on non-mythological topics], 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2000, pp. 37–50.
149 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 24.
150 Hannah Arendt, O przemocy. Nieposłuszeństwo obywatelskie 
[About violence. Civil disobedience], Wydawnictwo Aletheia, War-
szawa 1999, p. 58.
151 Cf. J. Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu…, op. cit., pp. 81–82.
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would be to develop argumentation without paying attention 
to the reactions of the interlocutor who obligatorily passes 
from the role of a passive listener to active participant of the 
conversation. The person who sermonizes and utters proph-
ecies without paying attention to the interlocutor’s reactions, 
will be soon deemed rather fanatical (…) more than a wise 
person who is trying to persuade others to his point of view.152
4.4. Further characteristics of the arguments of the Soviet courts 
Further three aspects of the argumentative process, pointed out by Perelman, 
which in a deformed form were used in the eristic of the Stalinist courts, need to be analysed
4.4.1. Uniformity of the sources of law
The philosopher writes: Addressing the groups which, what 
can be assumed, accept certain thesis on the account of the-
ir profession or religion, the author has the right to count 
on the support of these propositions. Therefore, the attorney 
can expect support from the fact that the judge’s standpo-
int assumes complying with the legislation of a particular 
country and every legal provision irrespective of their ori-
gin, starting from the moment of their acknowledgement by 
judicature.153 Mutatis mutandis, in cases where a rational 
legal discourse is possible, the sources of law, common for 
the participants, objectify the conditions of the trial (both 
formal and substantive-legal ones). To the contrary, tota-
litarian sources of law, common for a judge, attorney and 
prosecutor, in their ideological roots exclude the defendan-
t’s right to expect independent defence and they enfeeble 
his position154. Perelman’s postulate of pluralism is contra-
ry to the “monolithic” axiology of the totalitarian system 
of law. Similarly, the inaccessibility [hermeneutic nature] 
152 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 29.
153 Ibidem, p. 45.
154 Ideologization of the sources of the Soviet law is well illustrated 
on the example of criminal law. For example, in 1924, “the Basic Prin-
ciples of Criminal Law of the USSR and the Republics” were adopted. 
There was challenged the division into crimes, misdemeanours and 
offences, and there was introduced a division into offences against 
the foundations of the Soviet system and all other groups of crimes. 
After: Katarzyna Sójka-Zielińska, Historia prawa [History of law], 
Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, Warszawa 2005, p. 370.
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of the Soviet sources of law in the trial of the Sixteen caused 
that an attorney “obtains support” but rather for acknowled-
ging the guilt – presupposed from the beginning – of some 
accused (Okulicki)155.
4.4.2. Formal aspects of court argumentation
What is also worth mentioning are some formal aspects 
of the argumentation used by the Stalinist courts. This pro-
blem also needs to be raised because according to Perelman, 
the theory of argumentation is procedural in nature156. The 
philosopher writes: Arguments which are quasi-logical are 
the ones which could be understood by means of comparing 
them with formal thinking, of logical or mathematical cha-
racter157. It must be pointed out that “quasi-logical” methods, 
typical for legal positivism158, conjoined with a strict proce-
duralism, were effectively used in the Stalinist trials aga-
inst ideological enemies159. The Soviet judges applied, inter 
alia, legal syllogism which was to guarantee indisputability 
of reasoning and to create the pretense of their objectivity160. 
155 In a defence speech of Bień and Jasiukowicz, the attorney 
emphasized the guilt of Okulicki: “Okulicki refuses to admit that 
people here are charged with specific crimes. He tries to prove by any 
means that the „Home Army” commanded by Okulicki did not fight 
with the Red Army, which was sufficiently proved by convincing 
facts. But we know that the matter is different”. After: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 279.
156 After: J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa…, op. cit., 
p. 152.
157 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 65.
158 As for the problem of the logical character of the methods devel-
oped by legal positivism, see J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia 
prawa…, op. cit.,, pp. 34–35.
159 In a similar perspective, G. Radbruch writes about the law of the 
Third Reich: “(…) positivism, believing that „law means law” has 
made German legal practice defenceless against law established arbi-
trarily or with criminal intentions”. After: G. Radbruch, Ustawowe 
bezprawie…, op. cit., p. 249.
160 G. Radbruch also analyses the abuses made by the courts of the 
Third Reich and draws attention to the formal aspects of legal reason-
ing. The author cites the opinion of the post-war German prosecutor 
general: “Legal methods are only the means which a responsible law-
yer makes use of whenever he wishes to obtain a judgment with legal 
justification”. After: G. Radbruch, Ustawowe bezprawie…, op. cit., 
p. 247.
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In a similar vein, Perelman states that in practice there “occur 
twists” in the attempt to “hide the role of a judge in the legal 
syllogism”161. The philosopher justifies the thesis of a narrow 
perspective of quasi-logical legal reasoning in the following 
manner: In order to use these arguments reality must come 
down to a particular scheme of logical or mathematical cha-
racter, which constitutes the basis of reasoning, shifting the 
conclusion to particular reality162. Such a shift, hiding ideolo-
gy under the pretext of formal legal thought was for the Sta-
linist courts a useful eristic method. As Perelman notices: 
Quasi-logical argument requires, if we can say so, including 
reality in spatial structure which would exclude characteristic 
particular situations, like permeating, interacting, fluidity163. 
Similarly, the Soviet courts used black-or-white regulatory 
reasoning164 where “new Soviet man” was placed on one side 
and “reactionist” or “fascist” on the other165. The abovementio-
ned method was also applied against the Polish commanders 
of the Home Army. It was then a quasi – logical necessity that 
the one who did not cooperate with the Red Army, behaved 
similarly to the Nazis166.
161 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 213.
162 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 66.
163 Ibidem.
164 Cf. Urszula Wieczorek, „O dychotomicznym widzeniu świata, 
czyli o zwalczaniu wroga za pomocą słów” [„About the dichotomous 
vision of the world, that is, how to fight the enemy with words”], Język 
Polski LXXIV, Vol. 4–5 (1994), pp. 268–277.
165 The public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: 
“The geographic and economic position of Poland is such that it 
must either live in friendship with the Soviet Union or conclude an 
agreement with Germany. There is not and there will not be anoth-
er way. The Polish underground, which was entirely headed by the 
„government” in exile, chose an agreement with Germany”. After: 
Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 258. 
Cf. U. Wieczorek, „O dychotomicznym widzeniu świata…, op. cit.
166 The public prosecutor in a speech at the end of the trial of the 
Sixteen: “The commander of the underground unit of the Home Army, 
Stankiewicz [witness – M.P.] told the Court how his unit (…) was con-
ducting terrorist acts against the representatives of the Soviet author-
ities, officers and soldiers of the Red Army (…) The whole world is 
outraged by the bloody bestialities of the German fascist thugs, but the 
bandits from the «Home Army» are not much different from them”. After: 
Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., pp. 255–156.
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4.4.3. Sociotechnics of the courtroom
Furthermore, according to Perelman: The choice of certa-
in elements which are held and presented in speech, places 
these elements in the foreground of awareness and in this 
way awards them with the feature of presence which makes 
it impossible to ignore them. Presence directly influences 
our sensitivity. It is the truth, presenting a given object, like 
raising by Antonius Cesar’s the tunic stained with blood or 
like the presence of the defendant’s children can move the 
listeners or the members of the jury167.
In the context of this quotation one can think about soldiers 
keeping rifles with unsheathed bayonets in the courtroom dur-
ing the trial of the Sixteen168. Their presence was aimed, natu-
rally, to raise on the part of the defendants the feeling of threat. 
The abovementioned laughter in the courtroom during the trial 
of the Sixteen was also a sociotechnical method that depreciat-
ed the viewpoint of the accused169. J. Kochanowski emphasizes 
that the performance was impeccably directed170,171.
4.4.4. Argumentation of efficiency
Last but not least, the Stalinist courts used the argumentation 
based directly on the concept of efficiency – crucial to eristic. 
167 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 49.
168 Cf. N. Davies, Powstanie ’44…, op. cit., p. 613.
169 For example: “The chairman [of the panel]: After receiving 
this letter from Piemienov, the defendant appeared and was arrest-
ed? Okulicki: Yes. The chairman: And the criminal activity of the 
defendant against the Soviet Union has ended? Okulicki: Yes (laugh-
ter in the courtroom)”. After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organ-
izatorów…, op. cit., p. 170.
170 J. Kochanowski, Proces Szesnastu…, op. cit., p. 67.
171 Sociotechnical operations are applied in the courtrooms in differ-
ent totalitarian systems. For example, such measure was to take away 
the trouser belt, braces and false teeth form 67-years old German 
Field Marschall Ervin von Witzleben accused in front of Nazi “Peo-
ple’s Court” (Volksgerichtshof) of an attempt of Hitler’s life in 1944. 
Since the defendant was forced to hold his trousers all the time dur-
ing the trial and was unable to pronounce clearly, the presupposed 
effect was to humiliate him in front of the audience and depreciate 
his authority. Von Witzleben was tried and sentenced to death on 
August 7, 1944. Judgment was executed the following day. Cf. Nigel 
Jones, Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler, 
Casemate Publishers, London 2008, p. 250.
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Perelman defines this type of argumentation as “pragmatic”: 
it is the argument which allows to judge a particular activi-
ty on the basis of its results. According to Bentham, it is the 
only important argument when talking about acknowledging 
a particular legal norm. What does good justification of legal 
norm consist in? – In referring to good and bad effects that it 
can evoke. What does a false justification consist in? – In refer-
ring to any other thing, for or against the norm, whether in that 
which is good or what is bad172.
The pragmatic argument in the rhetoric of the Soviet 
courts served to justify Stalin’s method of facts occurred. 
Eristic remained here in a feedback loop with the actions 
undertaken by the Soviets in reality. Simplifying, in the Sta-
linist narrative, “bourgeois Poland went bankrupt173”, name-
ly it lost credibility and legal and international subjectivity 
because of the ineffectiveness of the policy174. This fate was 
shared by the Polish Underground State, represented, among 
others, by L. Okulicki and J. S. Jankowski175. Among oth-
er things, because the Second Republic of Poland suffered 
a defeat in the September campaign, the Soviet Union gained 
the right to “take care of” the population living in its East-
ern Border176. Pragmatic argument, as Perelman writes, 
which seems to reduce the value of the cause to the value 
172 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., pp. 98–99.
173 Cf. the text of Molotov’s note of 17 September 1939 (footnote 111).
174 From the final speech of the prosecutor in the trial of the Six-
teen: “They [the «representatives of the criminal reaction of the Poles»] 
were referred to by the companion Stalin in the following words (…): 
They preferred the policy of playing between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. And naturally they reaped their awards”. After: Sprawozdanie 
sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 238.
175 From the final speech of the prosecutor in the trial of the Sixteen: 
“The role of the leader in the Polish «government» in exile belongs to the 
pre-September 1939 fascist clique in Poland; it is precisely the main cul-
prit of the catastrophe that Poland faced in 1939”. After: ibidem, p. 242.
176 The motto of Molotov’s memorandum of 17 September 1939 is 
the following passage from the final speech of the prosecutor in the 
trial of the Sixteen: “This cabal [about the government of the Repub-
lic of Poland before the break-out of the war – M.P.] was not guid-
ed by the good of the Polish nation, but by the interest of a small 
group of magnates, feudals and senior military dignitaries oppress-
ing not only Ukrainians, Belarussians and Lithuanians, but also the 
Polish masses”. After: ibidem.
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of its results, gives the impression that all values belong to the 
same order, hence the authenticity of one point of view can be 
judged just like in pragmatism only by means of its results 
and a failure of a particular undertaking or a man can be 
even treated as a measure of irrationality of the undertaking 
or non-authenticity of a man177. The argument of efficiency 
corresponded therefore with Stalin’s political goals and com-
plemented the range of eristic techniques used in the courts 
against the leaders of the Polish Underground State.
4.4.5. Other argumentative techniques
To complement the analysis, one may indicate three other rhe-
toric methods pointed out by Perelman, which were in prac-
tice misused by the communist courts. These were as follows:
– argumentation through intensified example, in plural, 
“to make that what is singular the value of archetype which 
induces to generalization”. In case of the trial of the Sixteen, 
these were such expressions as “gangsters”, “criminals”, “ter-
rorists”, “saboteurs”, “murderers”178, etc.;
– argumentation from “anti-pattern”, which was used 
both in the trial of the Sixteen and in general Fieldorf’s tri-
al, in order to trigger in the members of the audience the dis-
gust and the urge to be distinguished179. For example, in the 
justification of the sentence in “Nil’s” trial, when describing 
the authorities of the Polish Underground State, there was 
used the phrase “fascist cabal”180. In turn, in the speech of the 
prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen there were 
used the words “blind moles of the underworld”, “puppets 
of marionette playing politics”, “puppies” [about President 
W. Raczkiewicz, General K. Sosnkowski and the Prime Min-
ister T. Arciszewski – M.P]181; “a handful of politicians”182, etc;
177 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 99.
178 The phrases in the prosecutor’s speech at the end of the tri-
al of the Sixteen, after: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organiza-
torów…, op. cit., pp. 238–264.
179 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 99.
180 After: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, op. cit., p. 333.
181 The phrases in the prosecutor’s speech at the end of the tri-
al of the Sixteen, after: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organiza-
torów…, op. cit., pp. 238–243.
182 The phrase in the prosecutor’s speech at the end of the trial 
of the Sixteen, after: ibidem, p. 280.
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– argumentation from ideal pattern. Perelman writes that: 
the advantage of an ideal model consists in the fact that it does 
not require perspicacity, it is sufficient to subordinate one’s 
behaviour to it in order to be on the right way. Although there 
is no obstacle to adjust divine pattern to the role which we 
want to give it.183 One may indicate that a ‘new Soviet man’, 
especially the soldier of the Red Army, was an ideal personal 
pattern which moderated the argumentation in the discussed 
cases. For example, in the justification of General Fieldorf’s 
judgment, we can read that (…) [the Soviet officers – M.P.] 
murdered [by the Home Army – M.P.] died with a shout “For 
Stalin – for the family”184.
5. Conclusion
In this essay there were analysed the assumptions of the the-
ory of rhetoric, developed by Chaïm Perelman. They served 
to discuss the argumentative abuse used by the courts 
during the Stalinist period. The undertaken characteristics 
referred to two model examples, namely the demonstration 
trial of the Sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground Sta-
te and the “court murder” of General A. Fieldorf “Nil”. The 
point of the argument was the difference between rational 
rhetoric, aimed at convincing the audience by the power 
of a better argument and the eristic, aiming per fas et nephas 
at a complete victory in the dispute.
In view of Perelman’s argumentative theory, the eristic 
abuse of the Stalinist courts consisted of negating the fun-
damental assumptions of rhetoric. Firstly, they relied on the 
instrumentation of the auditorium, that is, on the rejection 
of the mechanism for assessing the rationality of the argu-
ments raised in the discourse in the courtroom. As a result, 
the prosecution forced through the non-discursive concept 
of “truth” as well as the “hierarchy of values”, justifying the 
Soviet worldview and legitimizing the prosecution. Second-
ly, there was applied the technique of argumentation from 
the indisputable authority (of Stalin, of the Red Army, etc.), 
183 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 129.
184 Reprint of files in: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał „Nil”…, 
op. cit., p. 335.
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which led to the loss of the interaction in the discourse and 
resulted in a practically impossible defence. The situation 
of the accused was even more deteriorated by the inaccessi-
bility of ideologized sources of the Soviet positive law. Fur-
ther techniques used by the communist courts consisted, inter 
alia, in hiding the ideological content in formalized legal rea-
soning and in sociotechnical manipulation in the courtroom. 
Finally (what cannot raise surprise from the perspective of the 
assumptions of eristic), the Stalinist courts fostered efficiency 
as the legitimizing value of both the judgments handed down 
and the actual actions of “the people’s authority”. These and 
other signalled abuses of rhetorical techniques have resulted 
in the exclusion of the adversarial element in court proceedings 
and in the actual prejudgment before the beginning of the trial.
One could see that the basis of the Stalinist judicial eris-
tic were settled on quite strong foundations. Following Perel-
man, the presented arguments “established the structure 
of reality” and because of the coherence with the Soviet “axi-
ological axioms” they were not questionable. The defend-
ants acted against the presupposed “reality”, both during 
the investigation and in the course of the trial; therefore 
there was no possibility of exempting them from the charg-
es. In this context, there comes to mind H. Arendt’s remark 
that Stalin has questioned one of the last two binding com-
mandments – do not say false testimony185.
Repeatedly used, the totalitarian thesis has become an 
argument, settling the court dispute.
In conclusion it should be pointed out that according 
to Perelman’s view, the independent judicial authority is 
a prerequisite for the existence of the rule of law. Accord-
ing to the philosopher, it corresponds to the tripartite of the 
authority, the irrevocability of the judges and the prohibi-
tion of the existence of special courts186. From the perspec-
tive of “new rhetoric”, in the case of the erosion of the rule 
of law and the loss of independence by the courts, there 
arises the danger of their “eristic turn”. In these cases, the 
legal rhetoric, which in Perelman’s view is a model for every 
185 The second, according to Arendt, is “do not kill”. H. Arendt, 
Odpowiedzialność i władza…, op. cit., p. 182.
186 Ch. Perelman, Logika prawnicza…, op. cit., p. 194.
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argument, can create the most effective propaganda tools187. 
Therefore, in the presented approach, the eristic methods 
of prosecutors, judges and even attorneys which violate the 
rules of rational argumentative discourse188, become a form 
of violence on the part of the totalitarian power189. A sim-
ilar view was expressed, among others, by Paul Ricoeur, 
affected by the mechanisms of the Nazi propaganda dur-
ing internment in the POW camp190. In his ethical-semiotic 
analyses, Ricoeur emphasizes that violence can be hidden 
in language as a function of speech191. In that case, according 
to the philosopher, it is easy to indicate the line descending 
from the influence, a mild form of “the power over” to torture, 
the extreme form of abuse192. May the understanding of the 
187 For example, after the trial of the Sixteen, there was published 
a report addressed to a wide auditorium, of court minutes, complement-
ed by the propaganda introduction by A. Baliński. There are phras-
es such as “executors of the will of the group of London’s bankrupts” 
(p. 3–4); “assassin murderers of officers and Soviet soldiers” (p. 4); “liars 
to all” (page 5). Cf. The trial of Okulicki and others in Moscow before 
the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR on 18-20 June 
1945, Printing: Czytelnik, Warszawa 1945. Cf. Jerzy Bralczyk, „Strat-
egie propagandy politycznej” [„Strategies of political propaganda”], 
in: Jerzy Bartmiński, Renata Grzegorczykowa (Eds.), Język a kultura 
[Language and culture], Vol. 4: „Funkcje języka i wypowiedzi” [„Func-
tions of language and expression”], Wydawnictwo Wiedza o Kulturze, 
Wrocław 1991, pp. 105–115.
188 J. Stelmach writes that legal argumentation should be conduct-
ed in a manner that respects the principles of freedom and equality. 
This means, inter alia, that each participant in the discourse should 
have the same privileges and be subject to the same restrictions. 
Cf. J. Stelmach, Kodeks argumentacyjny…, op. cit., pp. 47–49.
189 “Mutatis mutandis” this problem is addressed by G. Radbruch, 
analysing the issue of the independence of the Third Reich courts. 
The author cites the opinion of the post-war prosecutor general: 
“(…) I think it is important to accuse the judges who pronounced 
judgments contrary to elementary humanity, and because of the triv-
iality they condemned defendants to death penalty”. G. Radbruch, 
Ustawowe bezprawie…, op. cit., p. 248.
190 Ricoeur spent five years in Oflag. The philosopher writes: “I was 
attracted, along with many others – the propaganda was intense – 
to certain aspects of Pétainism”. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Con-
viction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, 
Columbia University Press, New York 1998, pp. 16–20.
191 P. Ricoeur, O sobie samym…, op. cit., p. 365.
192 Ibidem.
44 | Marcin Pieniążek |
eristic methods of the Stalinist courts, possible through the 
research of Ch. Perelman and other argumentative theo-
rists, helped to avoid similar abuse in the future.
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